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THE  SCIENCE  OP  HISTORY 


By  Professor  CLARENCE  WALWORTH  ALVORD 

I 


[Reprinted  from  The  Popular  Science  Monthly,  May,  1914.] 


\ 


* 


[Reprinted  from  The  Popular  Science  Monthly,  May,  1914.] 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  HISTORY 


By  Professor  CLARENCE  WALWORTH  ALYORD 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


APOLEON’S  cynical  question,  “What  is  history  but  a fiction 


agreed  upon,”  suggests  a criticism  that  nervous  historians  have 
always  felt  the  need  of  answering;  and  much  investigation  and  many 
speculations  have  been  directed  at  the  adverse  critics  in  the  hope  of 


placing  the  popular  science  in  that  favored  class  where  are  found  such 
unassailable  sciences  as  chemistry  and  physics.  The  discussion  of  the 


proposition,  “Is  history  a science?”  depends  so  completely  on  the 
definition  of  the  term  “ science  ” that  one  is  tempted  to  take  refuge  with 
Mr.  Freeman  behind  the  old  English  equivalent,  “knowledge.”  The 


failure  to  recognize  the  difference  between  the  phenomena  of  history 


and  those  which  interest  the  natural  scientists  and  the  disinclination  to 
accept  limitations  not  common  to  all  sciences  have  always  been  the 
stumbling  blocks  for  those  theorists  who  would  lead  history  along  the 
path  of  objective  certainty.  History  has  its  limitations  and  to  ignore 
them  is  not  the  way  to  create  a science;  but  rather  we  must  state 
exactly  what  can  and  can  not  be  known,  so  that  we  may  escape  the 
will-o’-the-wisp  kind  of  sport,  a pastime  much  favored  by  the  speculative 
historian.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  recognize  the  peculiarities  of 
the  phenomena,  of  the  problem  presented  by  them,  and  of  the  method 
which  can  be  employed. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  the  phenomena  of  history,  the  activ- 
ities of  feeling,  thinking,  willing  men  associated  in  some  kind  of  a 
community  for  mutual  protection  and  benefit,  need  not  be  dwelt  upon, 
nor  is  a discussion  of  the  well-known  complexity  of  such  phenomena 
demanded.  Their  most  conspicuous  characteristic  is  that  they  all 
belong  to  the  past.  Whereas  in  other  sciences  the  facts  are  open  imme- 
diately to  experiment  or  observation,  the  events  of  history  are  studied 
mediately  through  the  reports  of  them,  except  in  so  far  as  actual  re- 
mains have  sporadically  reached  us.  With  a liberal  interpretation,  Mr. 
Froude  is  right  in  saying : 

Historical  facts  are  of  two  kinds,  the  veritable  outward  fact — whatever  it 
was  which  took  place  in  the  order  of  things — and  the  account  of  it,  which  has 
been  brought  down  to  us  by  more  or  less  competent  persons.  The  first  we  must 
set  aside  altogether.  The  eternal  register  of  human  action  is  not  open  to  in- 
spection. 

Yet  the  lack  of  faith  in  his  witnesses,  which  is  the  conspicuous 
characteristic  of  the  modern  historian,  is  the  safeguard  against  decep- 
tion. We  have  passed  far  beyond  the  naive  credulity  of  the  medieval 


9i 


THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 


annalist  and  demand  of  every  historical  source  proof  of  the  truth  within 
it.  We  must  know  which  of  our  sources  we  can  trust  and  how  far  we 
can  admit  them  as  witnesses  of  the  fact  and  what  was  the  fact. 

Every  period  of  the  past  offers  difficulties  and  obscurities  peculiar  to 
itself.  The  sources  are  either  too  meager  for  the  precise  determination 
of  the  event,  or  as  in  the  modern  epoch,  so  multitudinous  that  the  his- 
torian is  bewildered  by  the  reports  of  special  commissions  and  the  pub- 
lished and  unpublished  documents,  so  that  he  can  only  hew  a pathway 
through  the  wilderness.  Further  the  very  personality  of  the  writers 
makes  his  task  more  difficult.  If  they  are  ignorant,  can  he  trust  them  ? 
Are  they  prejudiced,  will  he  not  be  deceived?  Are  they  learned,  can 
he  give  due  allowance  to  the  ideas  and  ideals,  social,  political  and  reli- 
gious, with  which  they  weight  their  narrative?  Thus  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  science,  in  seeking  to  get  at  the  phenomena,  there  is 
endless  research  to  obtain  information  more  or  less  questionable.  For 
this  purpose  there  has  been  elaborated  a method  which  is  scientific 
both  in  spirit  and  in  the  results  obtained.  Yet  at  this  point,  however 
cautious  the  examination  of  the  sources,  there  enters  an  element  of 
doubt  into  our  knowledge  of  what  occurred  in  the  past.  On  such 
foundations  historians  should  not  seek  to  build  too  imposing  an  edifice. 
A careful  study  of  the  means  of  construction  should  be  made  in  order 
to  raise  a superstructure  whose  form  and  weight  have  been  carefully 
adjusted  to  the  weakness  of  the  substructure. 

The  historical  problem  must,  therefore,  be  stated  with  a full  con- 
sciousness of  the  peculiarities  of  the  phenomena.  Now  a scientist  may 
attempt  to  analyze  his  phenomena  and  disclose  their  constituents;  he 
may  seek  to  discover  the  essential  laws  of  their  being ; or  he  may  simply 
trace  their  growth.  This  last  is  unquestionably  the  point  of  view  of 
historians.  As  Dr.  Bernheim  says: 

History  is  the  science  of  the  evolution  of  man  in  his  activities  as  a social 
being. 

The  idea  of  evolution  is  peculiarly  an  historical  one ; that  events  are 
not  isolated,  but  fit  together  as  cause  and  effect  of  an  ever-changing 
whole,  is  the  assumption  which  underlies  all  historical  knowledge,  with- 
out which  no  progress  can  be  made;  every  movement  of  the  world’s 
history  conditions  the  next,  although  the  finite  mind  is  unable  to  follow 
the  line  of  connection  at  all  times.  The  fact  that  history  traces  an 
evolution  separates  its  problem  definitely  from  that  of  sociology,  with 
which  there  is  such  danger  of  confusion,  for  the  phenomena  of  the  two 
sciences  are  almost  the  same.  Sociology  is  the  science  of  social  statics, 
history  of  the  social  dynamics;  the  one  studies  the  average  of  masses, 
the  other  individual  facts  or  events;  sociology  would  explain  the  me- 
chanics of  society,  history  the  development;  the  former  seeks  to  dis- 
cover the  general  laws  underlying  the  particular  phenomena,  while  the 
latter  is  contented  to  trace  the  life  history  of  the  particular  event.  It 


THE  SCIENCE  IN  HISTORY 


492 


is  that  in  which  history  is  interested,  the  individual  fact  with  all  the 
differences,  marking  it  as  something  unique  in  the  past.  Sociology 
studies  the  same  phenomena,  but  draws  from  present  and  past  in  her 
search  for  conditions  of  like  kind,  disregarding  individual  variations, 
and  therefore  hopes — so  far  without  much  success — to  find  types  and 
even  discover  laws.  What  sociology  with  its  different  point  of  view  and 
method  may  hope  to  acomplish  is  not  a part  of  the  historical  problem. 

The  demand  has  been  made  of  the  science,  however,  that  it  disclose 
the  laws  of  social  dynamics.  The  futility  of  such  an  attempt  will  be 
more  fully  seen  after  the  discussion  of  the  method  of  reasoning  in  his- 
tory; but  at  the  present  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  to  dis- 
cover a law  by  observation — the  only  method  capable  of  being  employed 
by  the  historian — there  is  need  of  finding  a type  or  typical  development, 
the  law  of  which  will  be  the  law  of  all  similar  phenomena.  It  is  not  to 
be  denied  that  there  have  been  in  the  past  certain  recurrences  of  similar 
forms  which  some  philosophers  have  eagerly  asserted  to  be  typical 
regularities  of  social  development  from  which  laws  may  be  learned.  On 
account  of  the  complexity  of  the  phenomena,  in  which  these  similar  ele- 
ments are  closely  interwoven  with  variants,  and  because  the  observations 
at  best  are  unreliable  and  can  never  be  corrected  by  repeated  trial,  a com- 
plete knowledge  of  the  conditions  or  of  the  occurrence  is  not  possessed 
by  the  historian  and  there  is,  therefore,  no  secure  basis  for  an  induc- 
tion. Besides  the  collection  of  a number  of  similar  facts  from  various 
periods  is  not  the  usual  method  of  the  historian  in  whose  eyes  events  are 
individual  in  character,  never  combining  the  same  conditions,  never 
following  the  same  course.  These  very  differences  are  those  which  he 
seeks.  Even  here  he  must  acknowledge  himself  baffled  in  his  search  for 
the  sufficient  cause  of  these  variations  which  mark  them  unique.  He 
finds  their  beginnings  and  traces  their  development,  but,  as  far  as  his 
knowledge  goes,  it  is  conceivable  that  quite  another  succession  of  events 
might  have  been  enacted,  and  then  he  would  have  zealously  shown  how 
it  too  fitted  into  the  evolution  past  and  present  and  interdigitated  so 
accurately  with  the  other  phenomena.  From  the  observation  of  an 
isolated  event,  dissimilar  to  all  others,  no  law  can  be  formulated. 

From  another  point  of  view  attempts  have  been  made  to  discover  the 
laws  controlling  historical  development.  The  world’s  history  is  con- 
tinuous ; each  nation,  each  period  forms  but  a part  of  the  grand  whole ; 
on  this  broader  field  can  we  find  laws  of  historical  evolution.  We  his- 
torians stand  in  a very  different  relation  to  our  phenomena  than  does 
the  natural  scientist;  in  the  twisting  and  squirmings  of  the  microcosm 
we  read  our  own  destiny.  Never  can  we  get  outside  of  the  course  of  the 
evolution  of  which  we  are  ourselves  a part,  and  view  it  as  something 
entirely  foreign  to  our  wills.  An  objective  criterion  of  the  truth, 
although  not  wholly  lacking,  is  still  by  no  means  so  perfect  as  that 
offered  the  natural  scientists.  But  a still  greater  difficulty  confronts 


493 


THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 


us ; there  is  no  whole  and  completed  development  in  the  world’s  history ; 
the  beginning  and  the  end  are  unknown ; the  origin  is  shrouded  in  dark- 
ness; before  the  future  there  hangs  the  veil  of  Mayo;  we  can  observe 
the  pupa  or  cocoon,  but  not  the  caterpillar  and  moth.  Under  such 
conditions  every  explanation  must  be  subjective  in  character. 

Leaving  then  to  one  side  the  search  for  laws  of  social  dynamics,  the 
historian  contents  himself  with  disclosing  the  causal  relations  of  the 
successive  movements  in  the  evolution  of  human  society,  and  this  is 
the  sole  aim  of  history;  but  even  here  the  science  is  subject  to  important 
limitations  for  the  use  of  experiment  is  impossible,  so  that  the  method 
must  be  that  of  observation.  At  best  many  disadvantages  confront  the 
observer,  which  are  not  encountered  by  the  experimenter,  so  that  his  results 
form  a very  insecure  basis  for  induction,  unless,  as  in  other  sciences,  his 
observations  can  be  often  repeated  and  the  human  senses  aided  by  sensi- 
tive instruments.  But  repetition  and  the  use  of  instruments  are  not  for  the 
historian,  who  works  over  the  observations  of  the  untrained  minds  of  the 
past.  In  seeking  the  cause  or  causes  of  any  phenomenon  the  natural 
scientist  views  it  as  a type  of  a large  class;  and  even  in  the  case  where 
causation  is  determined  by  a single  experiment,  there  always  exist 
numerous  phenomena  of  the  same  kind  or  else  the  particular  phenom- 
enon offers  itself  to  the  possible  repetition  of  the  observation,  so  that 
the  assurance  of  the  opportunity  of  repeating  the  test  case  plays  an 
important  part  in  the  induction.  The  scientist  abstracts  from  the 
occurrence  all  individual  variations  and  finds  the  cause  of  the  typical 
phenomenon,  which  is  generalized  in  thought  so  as  to  cover  all  indi- 
viduals of  like  kind.  Thus  are  obtained  causal  relations,  which  have 
objective  truth.  Such  a method  of  abstraction  is  inapplicable  in  his- 
tory, for,  as  we  have  already  seen,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  historian 
each  phenomenon  is  exceptional  and  can  not  be  classified  to  find  types, 
and  also  the  same  conditions  and  events  never  recur. 

In  the  search  for  causal  relations  how  far  is  it  possible  to  make  use 
of  the  canons  of  inductive  logic  ? On  account  of  the  reasons  stated  above 
it  is  impossible  to  find  two  events  which  agree  or  disagree  in  all  respects 
except  one.  Therefore  the  canons  of  agreement  and  difference  are  of 
no  assistance  in  historical  research.  The  impracticability  of  these 
canons  in  history  has  always  been  acknowledged,  and  yet  the  literature 
of  history  as  well  as  of  sociology  and  economics  is  filled  with  errors 
arising  from  their  unscientific  use. 

Of  the  inductive  canons  there  remain  those  of  residue  and  of  con- 
comitant variations,  neither  of  which  is  a very  safe  criterion  of  causal 
relations  and  both  of  which  can  to  a limited  extent  be  employed  by  the 
historian.  When  there  are  general  propositions  proved  by  other  sci- 
ences, such  as  psychology,  sociology  and  economics,  which  will  establish 
the  needed  partial  causation,  the  canon  of  residue  can  be  U3ed.  The 
value  of  such  reasoning  will  depend  on  the  reliability  of  the  general 


THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 


494 


propositions  and  on  the  historical  possibility  of  their  being  true  when 
applied  to  the  conditions  of  a society  of  the  past.  Again  the  certainty 
of  the  result  will  depend  on  the  assurance  that  the  historian  has  dis- 
covered all  the  conditions,  and  this  will  always  remain  an  open  question. 
The  reverse  process,  so  popular  with  sociologists  and  psychologists,  is 
also  of  some  service.  By  the  collection  of  the  data  of  individual  acts 
and  striking  an  average,  the  personal  volitional  element  can  be  approxi- 
mately eliminated,  and  the  residue  over  and  above  the  probable  conduct 
reveals  a partial  cause  of  the  activities  of  the  masses.  Besides  the 
meager  data  which  the  past  affords  and  the  impossibility  of  sending 
elaborate  questionnaires  to  past  generations,  both  of  which  facts  hinder 
the  use  of  this  method,  the  results  reached  by  such  means  show  only 
the  general  tendency,  the  probable  action,  and  not  the  particular  acts 
and  motives  which  form  such  a prominent  feature  of  history. 

The  true  method  of  history  would  seem  to  be  the  canon  of  con- 
comitant variations;  but  unfortunately  there  is  no  invariable  measure, 
as  in  the  physical  sciences,  by  which  variations  can  be  mathematically 
determined.  All  elements  of  social  life  vary  continually.  If  we  select 
one  as  a measure  for  all,  we  may  be  using  that  which  is  most  variable 
and  certainly  one  of  the  causes  of  variations  in  other  elements  of  society. 
In  fact  a social  yard-stick  is  wanting.  In  the  study  of  primitive  society 
this  canon  has  been  employed  successfully  because  of  the  large  number 
of  similar  phenomena,  both  past  and  present,  but  it  fails  to  satisfy  the 
needs  of  the  historian  of  a civilized  people. 

By  this  hasty  review  of  the  canons  of  inductive  reasoning,  it  is 
seen  that  only  two,  and  these  the  least  desirable,  can  be  employed  by  the 
historian,  and  then  with  very  material  limitations.  History  is  not  a 
science  of  pure  induction  and  never  can  be.  The  facts  of  history  could 
never  be  joined  into  causal  relations  by  induction  alone.  If  there  were 
no  other  means,  history  would  remain  chronology. 

How  then  can  causal  relations  be  established  by  the  historian  ? The 
answer  is : “ By  deductive  and  teleological  reasoning,  for  the  most  part 
by  the  latter/’ 

The  past  illustrates  the  operation  of  the  laws  which  have  been  estab- 
lished by  the  social  sciences.  The  method  of  deduction  can  be  em- 
ployed in  cases  where  individual  volition  can  be  eliminated,  where 
causes  psychological  or  economic  affect  large  masses  of  individuals, 
bringing  about  important  historical  changes.  In  tracing  economic 
development  and  social  psychic  life  this  method  establishes  causes  which 
satisfy  the  mind  and  a large  mass  of  historical  knowledge  is  thus  re- 
moved from  the  charge  of  uncertainty. 

As  a rule,  however,  the  historian’s  view  of  the  past  is  teleological. 
We  are  obliged  to  pass  from  effect  to  cause  just  as  we  do  when  reviewing 
our  own  lives.  Knowing  the  end  reached  by  human  society  at  any 
period,  we  trace  back  the  events  which  have  been  the  means  of  bringing 


495 


THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 


about  this  existing  state.  Every  event  is  a means  to  an  end;  it  is 
purposive.  Either  some  seemingly  unimportant  event  has  widened  into 
numerous  ends  or  the  many  events  have  united  to  produce  a given  end. 
According  to  this  point  of  view,  the  historian  eliminates  factors  which 
seemingly  have  no  purposive  relation  to  the  result.  These  effects  are 
employed  to  explain  causes  rather  than  that  causes  are  shown  blindly  to 
produce  effects.  As  Mr.  Freeman  constantly  insisted: 

You  can  not  understand  the  present  without  a knowledge  of  the  past,  nor 
can  you  understand  the  past  without  a knowledge  of  the  present. 

The  present  is  the  purposed  end  and  is  to  be  explained  by  the  means 
which  brought  it  into  being.  The  past  is  the  means  and  can  only  be 
understood  in  the  light  of  the  end  which  it  is  to  bring  about.  In  the 
natural  sciences  there  is  no  such  view  of  phenomena  as  this  predomi- 
nating. Chemical  affinities  are  not  regarded  as  means  to  bring  about 
ends,  but  as  forces  which  produce  effects  blindly  and  necessarily  and 
will  do  so  on  all  occasions;  there  is  nothing  arbitrary  about  the  indi- 
vidual result;  but  in  history  we  are  dealing  with  human  society,  where 
movement  is  caused  by  volition,  by  “individual  will  acts.”  As  far  as 
man  can  perceive,  history  is  made,  not  entirely,  of  course,  but  very 
materially  by  purposive  ideas  and  not  wholly  by  the  blind  action  of 
chemical-physical  forces. 

Instinctively  one  asks  whether  this  teleological  view  corresponds 
with  the  actual  state  of  society,  and  the  answer  must  be  negative. 
Studying  society  carefully  before  any  great  historical  movement,  it 
would  seem  that  out  of  it  any  number  of  events  might  emerge.  There 
are  possibilities  of  many  great  movements  from  the  conditions  present; 
and,  after  we  know  the  outcome,  we  have  a case  of  double  sixes  appear- 
ing when  the  dice  are  thrown.  We  may  argue  from  the  double  sixes 
back  to  the  cause,  if  we  will;  but  from  the  causes  ascertained  by  us, 
double  twos  might  have  resulted  as  well.  The  solution  of  a problem  in 
probabilities  is  the  final  result  of  any  science  which  studies  human 
dynamics. 

We  have  hit  upon  the  weakness  in  any  argument  to  prove  history 
a science  comparable  to  the  natural  sciences.  The  scientist  believes  in 
the  universal  reign  of  causality  and  fixes  as  the  goal  of  his  search  the 
establishment  of  causal  relations  between  his  phenomena  which  have 
truth  in  reality,  that  is,  objective  truth.  The  belief  in  the  persistency  of 
such  causal  relations  assures  him  that  there  lurks  no  subjective  ele- 
ment in  his  result.  How  the  phenomena  of  developing  society  are  of 
such  a nature  that  any  association  of  causal  relation  between  them  will 
generally  contain  an  element  of  uncertainty,  because  there  is  lacking 
an  objective  criterion;  and  hence  the  mind  hesitates  to  assume  that  a 
knowledge  of  the  complete  cause  is  ascertained  or  that  the  effect  must 
have  followed  the  causes  which  can  be  determined.  That  all  which 
happens  in  society  is  the  result  of  effective  causes  can  not  be  denied  by 


THE  SCIENCE  IN  HISTORY 


496 


one  believing  in  the  -uniformity  of  nature,  but  it  is  denied  that  the  mind 
is  able  to  peer  through  the  darkness  of  the  past  and  see  the  hidden  work- 
ings of  forces  in  the  soui  of  humanity. 

Historians  have  been  loath  to  acknowledge  frankly  this  limitation, 
and  instead  have  promulgated  various  theories  to  account  for  human 
phenomena  without  even  a tacit  assumption  of  ignorance.  They  would 
prove  that  history  has  been  caused  by  universal  forces,  cognizable  by 
man,  and  that  man  is  an  automaton,  tossed  hither  and  thither  as  the 
forces  of  the  cosmos  have  acted  upon  him.  To  this  end  social  evolution 
has  often  been  likened  to  the  life  of  a living  organism  and  the  re- 
semblances are  sufficiently  remarkable.  It  is  influenced  by  its  environ- 
ment; it  has  its  separate  parts  with  their  functions;  blood  vessels  and 
nerves  are  not  lacking;  and  the  cells  are  the  individuals  of  which  so- 
ciety is  composed.  The  simile  is  a very  happy  one,  but  it  remains  a 
simile. 

Misled  by  the  resemblances,  historians  have  often  sought  to  carry 
over  into  their  field  of  inquiry  the  methods  of  the  biologists,  hoping 
thus  to  silence  forever  the  denunciations  of  inexactness  and  to  estab- 
lish causation  in  their  science  in  the  same  way  as  it  is  done  by  the  in- 
vestigations of  the  life  of  the  lower  animals  and  plants.  According  to 
this  theory,  the  cosmic  causes  of  the  varying  phenomena  among  people 
are  to  be  sought  in  their  physical  environment.  In  the  ultimate  analy- 
sis, natural  variations  must  be  derived  from  the  same  source,  for  “ we 
can  not  regard  any  nation  as  an  active  agent  in  differentiating  itself. 
Only  the  surrounding  circumstances  can  have  any  effect  in  such  a di- 
rection.” Yet  as  far  as  the  historian  is  concerned  these  national  va- 
rieties are  the  most  important  facts  in  his  knowledge  and  the  ultimate 
explanation  of  many  events  in  the  world’s  history.  As  Mr.  Symonds 
says, 

Nothing  is  known  for  certain  about  the  emergence  from  primitive  barbar- 
ism of  the  great  races,  or  about  the  determination  of  national  characteristics. 
Analogues  may  be  adduced  from  the  material  world;  but  the  mysteries  of  or- 
ganized vitality  remain  impenetrable.  What  made  the  Jew  a Jew,  the  Greek  a 
Greek,  is  as  unexplained  as  what  daily  causes  the  germs  of  an  oak  and  of  an  ash 
to  produce  different  trees. 

History  has  to  accept  this  dissimilarity  of  peoples  with  all  its  re- 
sults, for  an  unproved  hypothesis  should  not  form  the  foundation  of  its 
method. 

Closely  connected  with  the  above  is  the  still  unsolved  problem  of 
heredity.  Is  not  heredity  one  of  the  great  causes  of  variation  among 
men  and  hence  an  important  factor  in  the  production  of  historical  move- 
ment? This  question,  to  which  I shall  return  later,  must  be  answered 
in  the  affirmative  by  the  historian,  to  whom  the  differences  between  in- 
dividuals and  between  nations  are  conspicuous  characteristics  of  his 
phenomena,  and  as  far  as  his  information  reaches  are  due  to  the  acci- 
dents of  birth  as  well  as  to  environment. 


497 


THE  SCIENCE  IN  HISTORY 


Furthermore,  the  biological  historian  slights  the  great  internal  fact 
which  separates  the  social  organism  from  all  others  and  makes  it  a 
unicum,  to  the  study  of  which  the  biological  laws  are  not  applicable, 
namely,  the  social  psychic  life  which  is  such  a large  factor  in  the  evo- 
lution of  man.  It  is  a characteristic  of  highly  organized  society  to 
wean  itself  from  that  dependence  on  the  physical  environment  which 
is  such  an  important  element  in  the  lives  of  animals  and  savages. 
Therefore  a community  of  human  beings  can  not  be  treated  as  an 
unconscious  organism,  wholly  conditioned  by  its  material  surround- 
ings which  create  blind  forces  determining  its  development.  Organic 
needs  do  not  make  psychic  factors  subservient  to  them,  rather  the  op- 
posite is  the  case.  Mind  exercises  a control  over  the  material  needs  and 
directs  the  exertions  of  society.  The  vague  use  of  the  terms  of  biological 
science,  natural  and  sexual  selection,  when  employed  in  speaking  of 
the  social  evolution,  seem  more  metaphorical  than  real;  for  on  this 
higher  plane  of  life  the  two  laws  play  but  a very  subordinate  part, 
both  being  subservient  to  intelligent  choice  without  the  necessary  result 
of  the  elimination  of  the  weak  and  “ unfitted/5  The  mental  life  of  man, 
which  takes  the  forms  of  religion,  science,  art,  and  mechanical  inven- 
tions, creates  an  environment  of  a wholly  unbiological  character  and 
becomes  by  accumulation  a tradition,  a psychic  environment,  or  rather 
it  is  the  soul  of  the  organism;  for  the  individual  men,  the  cells  of  the 
organism,  change  but  little  from  generation  to  generation  and  do  not 
alter  their  physiological  character,  nor  do  they,  as  ages  pass,  acquire 
any  great  increase  of  power,  mental  or  spiritual.  The  evolution,  in 
fact,  during  the  historical  period  is  transferred  from  the  individuals 
of  society  to  the  social  psychic  environment  of  the  community,  which 
undergoes  changes  from  age  to  age,  as  the  activities  of  men  of  successive 
generations  add  their  portion  to  history.  Thus  no  physical  and  phys- 
iological analysis  of  this  peculiar  organism  can  satisfy  the  requirements 
of  our  science.  After  the  study  of  the  economic  struggles  and  the 
institutions  of  any  period,  which  also  have  a psychic  side,  there  remains 
for  the  historian  the  tracing  of  the  mental  and  spiritual  life  in  its 
various  and  complicated  forms. 

Certain  theorists  claim  that  we  have  in  this  psychic  environment  a 
means  of  determining  the  sufficient  causes  of  historical  events.  The 
physical  and  psychical  environment  together  reveal  the  sufficient  reason 
for  the  acts  of  any  generation.  There  can  be  no  question  of  arbitrary 
self-determination:  for,  born  into  certain  conditions,  man  acts  as  the 
forces  physical  and  spiritual  compel  him.  Given  the  territory,  the 
national  characteristics,  the  institutions,  the  social  psychic  environ- 
ment and  we  have  history  a connected  whole  with  cause  and  effect  veri- 
fied as  in  the  natural  sciences.  The  activities  of  individuals  in  relation 
to  these  great  forces  are  like  the  waves  on  the  surface  of  the  deep 

VOL.  lxxxiv. — 34. 


THE  SCIENCE  IN  HISTORY 


498 


ocean.  A man  may  raise  himself  above  the  level  a moment  but  sinks 
back,  having  affected  the  whole  so  little  that  the  historian  can  eliminate 
the  free-will  acts  of  individuals  and  treat  only  the  life  history  of 
generic  man.  “The  new  direction  of  historical  investigation,”  says 
Professor  Lamprecht,  the  leader  of  this  movement,  “has  first  brought 
pure  causality  into  history,  because  it  seeks  to  prove  the  causal  coherence 
of  the  generic  life  of  man,  and  does  not  confine  itself  to  the  deeds  of 
eminent  men.”  It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  such  an  historical  hypothesis 
has  value,  but  it  is  one-sided  and,  as  far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  is  but 
half  a truth. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  from  the  nature  of  the  subject 
matter,  history  is  concerned  with  the  particular  rather  than  the  general. 
It  is  the  personal  act  amidst  the  almost  never  changing  activities  of  the 
masses  that  interests  us.  This  personal  act,  however,  is  an  unknown 
quantity  in  every  generation.  The  generic  man  is  but  an  average  of 
the  community,  within  which  there  are  numerous  variations,  just  as  is 
found  by  the  naturalist  among  the  individuals  of  any  species  of  animals. 
These  variations  are  not  due  wholly  to  the  physical  and  psychical 
environment,  but  come  partly  from  the  accidents  of  birth,  which  the 
historian  can  not  trace  to  their  first  cause.  The  forces  which  are  to 
produce  historical  movements  are  not  existent  except  in  the  souls  of 
these  individuals  of  which  the  average  of  any  given  community  would 
take  no  account.  The  social  psychic  environment  will  affect  and 
develop  these  variants  in  different  ways,  and  the  sum  total  of  these 
variations  will  give  rise  to  historical  phenomena  which  would  not  be 
perceived  in  the  external  causes  acting  on  the  community. 

After  the  fact  we  can  know  the  effect,  but  why  there  was  that  par- 
ticular effect  instead  of  many  possible  others  escapes  our  search.  Within 
the  zone  where  past  tradition  meets  present  variations,  we  can  not 
follow  the  intricate  working  of  forces.  In  the  last  analysis,  therefore, 
an  important  cause  of  historical  phenomena  lies  in  the  soul  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  must  be  sought  in  his  variations  from  the  multitude,  a 
mystery  locked  in  the  secret  chambers  of  the  germ  cell,  in  his  relation  to 
the  past,  which  constantly  changes  with  the  person,  in  his  motives  of 
action,  which  can  not  be  massed  with  those  of  his  fellows.  Infinite 
knowledge  may  follow  amidst  the  complex  mingling  of  will  and  will, 
desire  and  desire,  of  the  millions  of  individuals  the  line  of  cause  and 
effect,  but  man  with  human  intelligence  stands  in  the  presence  of  any 
generation  as  before  the  entrance  of  a dark  cavern  into  whose  innermost 
recesses  his  eyes  can  not  penetrate. 

The  higher  the  civilization  the  greater  these  variations  from  the 
average.  Savages  are  much  more  similar  psychically  than  the  more 
civilized,  just  as  plants  conform  to  the  type  closer  in  the  natural  state 


499 


THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 


than  in  the  cultivated.  It  is  this  close  approximation  to  a type  that 
gives  the  biologist  encouragement  in  his  investigation  of  the  life  of  the 
lower  organisms.  As  soon  as  he  is  compelled  to  acknowledge  the 
entrance  into  his  problem  of  individual  volition,  his  hope  of  discovering 
laws  or  causal  relations  similar  to  those  found  by  the  chemist  or 
physicist  is  limited  just  as  is  the  case  of  the  historian.  In  civilized 
nations  the  variations  among  men  are  multitudinous.  Amidst  such 
great  dissimilarities  can  we  talk  of  a generic  man?  Is  every  one  com- 
pounded of  two  parts,  a personal  and  generic  ? 

There  are  times  when  the  contrary  theory  seems  justifiable,  when 
one  is  willing  to  declare  with  Emerson : 

Every  true  man  is  a cause,  a country,  an  age:  requires  infinite  space  and 
number  and  time  fully  to  accomplish  his  thought — and  posterity  seems  to  follow 
his  steps  as  a procession.  A man  Caesar  is  born  and  for  ages  after  we  have  a 
Roman  Empire.  Christ  is  born  and  millions  of  minds  so  grow  and  cleave  to  hia 
genius,  that  he  is  confounded  with  the  possible  of  man.  An  institution  is  the 
lengthened  shadow  of  one  man,  as  the  Reformation  of  Luther — Methodism  of 
Wesley.  All  history  resolves  itself  very  easily  into  the  biography  of  a few  stout 
and  earnest  persons. 

To  outward  seeming  eminent  men  are  the  result  of  fortuitous  vari- 
ation and  are  similar  to  the  “ sports  ” of  the  biologist,  since  the  connec- 
tion between  them  and  their  origin  remains  even  more  obscure  than 
slighter  variations;  and  these  “ sports ” of  history  are  unquestionably 
the  direct  cause  of  changes  in  the  community.  Their  peculiarities  are 
preserved,  permeate  the  whole  mass  of  individuals  and  become  in  time 
part  of  the  social  tradition.  The  simile  of  the  deep  ocean  of  social 
psychic  life  and  the  waves  of  individual  activities  does  not  present  the 
correct  picture,  for  the  waves  subside  and  leave  the  depth  of  the  ocean 
the  same,  while  the  influence  of  the  individual  does  not  disappear  but 
lives  on  after  his  death,  increasing  the  extent  and  variety  of  that 
environment  out  of  which  he  came. 

The  limitations  of  the  science  of  history  are  very  real.  The  phe- 
nomena are  hidden  in  the  past  from  personal  observation,  are  the  most 
complex  of  all  sciences,  are  unique  in  character  and  apparently  the 
result  of  the  will  acts  of  individual  men,  whose  motives  are  derived  from 
mingled  hereditary  and  environmental  influences.  At  times  the  historian 
can  by  induction  or  deduction  discover  a sufficient  cause  of  the  phe- 
nomena, but  more  frequently  he  is  obliged  to  acknowledge  the  impossi- 
bility of  unravelling  the  tangled  thread  of  causal  relations  amidst  the 
purposive  and  arbitrary  acts  of  millions  of  individuals.  As  historians 
must  seek  for  the  social  forces  in  the  souls  of  the  individuals  composing 
society,  historical  cause  will  always  remain  in  the  circle  of  probability 
and  thus  differ  from  the  causes  established  by  scientists  in  the  physical 
and  biological  world. 


**•  !■> 


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